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Judging Fed Policy Path Requires Keeping One Eye on Domestic Economic Fault Lines and Another on Those Abroad

The policy statement released on Wednesday by the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) represents a continuation of the “wait-and-see” trend anticipated by the market. The Fed continues to keep the door open to interest rate policy normalization, which it began in December, with the pace of change dictated by economic data and financial conditions. Overall, economic data in the U.S. have marginally deteriorated since the central bank embarked on rate normalization away from emergency conditions, but the Fed’s mandated objectives of full employment and price stability are still largely on track for continued tightening this year, even if at a slower pace than anticipated. Indeed, the language of today’s statement highlighted some of those concerns, for example mentioning that “business fixed investment and net exports have been soft.” Also, vitally, the FOMC stated that “…global economic and financial developments continued to pose risks,” underscoring the extent to which external economic and financial market stresses can influence Fed policy today.

Further, the FOMC’s changes to its Statement of Economic Projections (SEP) also highlight the likely slower path of interest rate change this year, and some continued uncertainty over U.S. growth prospects in a world of slowing economic growth overall. For example, the Fed downgraded real GDP growth projections in 2016, from the 2.4% it had assumed in December to 2.2% today, with 2017 growth also witnessing a modest reduction. We agree that the data will continue to marginally deteriorate from here, which justifies the Fed’s lowered anticipated “dot-plot” path of one or two more hikes by year-end, versus the four implied by the December SEP. We believe the door was open to beginning this normalization process a couple years ago, and to some extent the Fed missed its optimal window of opportunity to normalize rates in an easier manner. Today, the central bank must contend with payrolls growth that is likely peaking, challenging financial market conditions from abroad, and an inflation rate that appears to be firming.

Unlike some others, we don’t believe the U.S. economy will enter a recession anytime soon, but labor market growth will slow in the quarters ahead, as companies are scaling back expenditures of all kinds (capital expenditures, hiring, and inventory-builds, for example), as their top-line revenues and earnings decelerate. Moreover, changes to headline payrolls tend to lag corporate earnings/profits changes by a six-month time frame, so the rolling over of the growth rate of corporate profits in recent quarters should feed through to a worsening jobs picture by the back half of 2016. Further, temporary hiring has started to slow, which historically has been a signal of future weakness in payrolls growth, as it hints at changes in the supply/demand of labor. All these dynamics put the Fed in a difficult position regarding normalizing rates, since the economic cycle may be moderating as the central bank seeks to raise rates.

We are not arguing that these dynamics represent a tangible economic weakness that threatens the recovery, but rather that slowing payrolls growth is likely to keep the Fed’s rate normalization path more contained than outlined at the December meeting, and perhaps even than the path implied by today’s SEP. We also think there is a tangible wage and inflation lag, and believe that this will also play out going forward, as we have recently witnessed with current inflation data, such as Average Hourly Earnings, the CPI and Core PCE readings.

Generally speaking, it is not the U.S. consumer that concerns us, as consumer spending is likely to support the economy on the back of very strong employment growth over the past few years and potentially improved wage growth in the year ahead. What does concern us, though, is another potential economic fault line, the fact that a variety of corporate sector metrics have been disappointing of late. Years of extraordinarily easy monetary policy stoked corporate borrowing and financial engineering, and some companies are now struggling with the increased debt load as revenues and profits begin to roll over (see graph).

Additionally, what is ironic is that while everyone (understandably) focuses on the domestic economic situation, the factor that has opened the door again for the Fed to keep moving rates this year, which seemed impossible only a few weeks ago, is the improvement in financial conditions. That has largely come on the heels of China policy makers making a decision to not aggressively devalue their currency to protect against capital flight, an aggressive ECB, and a stabilization in oil’s persistent price descent. Thus, while we think that the U.S. data is marginally deteriorating, and may continue to do so, we think that financial conditions, including the potential strength of the USD (and its related influence on global growth and corporate earnings), will be one of the primary determinants of whether that door for further Fed moves stays open or gets slammed shut due to global economic/market duress.

Hence, keeping an eye on the Fed for market price-action going forward may also mean keeping the other eye focused outside the U.S., and somewhat outside the Fed’s core dual mandates of employment and price stability. Indeed, the path of monetary policy change in the year ahead may be determined as much by what occurs outside the country’s borders than within them; more so than any time in recent history.

MiFID II and Lessons from The UK

| For Alicia Miguel | 0 Comentarios

Europe has been given some breathing space with the MiFID implementation being put back a year, but this is not an excuse to sit still and doing nothing. As RDR was the precursor for MiFID II, distributors in Continental Europe have turned to the UK to understand how it might affect the distribution landscape and what lessons if any can be learned.

First of all, it’s important to understand one of the fundamental differences between RDR and MiFID. In the UK, advice has to be paid for whether it is provided by an independent financial adviser, a tied adviser or a bank adviser. All advice must be paid for. This had the unwanted effect of creating an advice gap because modest investors were no longer able to afford advice. In addition, banks pulled out of advice provision because they could not offer a cost-effective service and because they were concerned of future poor advice scandals.

In Europe the situation is different. Under MiFID II, only independent advice has to be paid for, meaning that tied advisers can continue to benefit from retrocessions as long as these are declared to the investor. This will not create an advice gap as it has done in the UK, but it is likely to drive investors towards solutions where they do not have to pay for advice (although in reality they will pay much more over the years in rebates). For countries with nascent advice industries, such a move could spell trouble but there are plenty of ways that independent advisers and wealth managers can fight back and ensure they have a long-term future in financial services.

Lesson one: It is important to remember that this is a supply-side reform. Investors will always need advice, but how they access it will change. People will still need advice on their savings and investments and long-term plans. The industry is not going to end just because of this new legislation.

Lesson two: work closely with the regulator to ensure that you get the best out of this legislation in Spain. Don’t protest and be difficult, make sure your voice and opinions are heard and taken into account.

Lesson three: Don’t wait until it’s too late. The most successful advice and wealth businesses in the UK started working on their post RDR model straightaway. You can gain a competitive advantage by working out your proposition now. Review your costs, your client base and understand how you add value. Promote that message consistently.

Lesson four: Don’t try to do things the old way. You need to adapt and change to the new environment. Make the use of technology and the internet to deliver a streamlined and cost-effective service. Make your proposition as attractive as possible to your clients.

Lesson five: Do not wait for the regulator or the press to promote your business. Do it yourself and do it now. Push your trade associations to work with you to promote the value of independent advice and superior investment skills. Be proactive. Advertise. Place articles in the press. Do everything you can to persuade consumers that tied advice is not the best advice.

And if all else fails, there is one last thing you can do… define yourself as non-independent!

Opinion column by Bella Caridade-Ferreira, CEO at Fundscape

The presentations can be found here.

Low Visibility, High Opportunity

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

Commentators speak about a “Something Must Be Done” approach to politics, where any action is deemed better than no action. Behavioral economists warn of a similar bias among investors, the need to tinker in ways that often end up eroding returns. In difficult environments like today’s, such biases can become irresistible.

From the standpoint of our Asset Allocation Committee, however, a dispassionate look at the global economy and markets leads to low levels of conviction. Large directional bets amongst broad asset classes, on a 6-18 month horizon, are mostly off the table for now. Global growth is uninspiring; central banks seem to have lost their ability to influence markets; political risks loom; and high levels of financial market volatility seem at odds with mostly benign fundamental economic data.

Positive results from policy moves now appear to have built-in limitations. Should the dollar rise too much, it will likely curtail U.S. corporate earnings and suppress the wider economy. Should corporate earnings and wages take off, Fed Chair Janet Yellen will likely raise rates and undermine confidence in market liquidity. There is somewhat of a guardrail around a neutral position that could limit the payoff for risk taking, and the time the market takes to second-guess these limitations gets shorter and shorter. The Bank of Japan’s move to negative rates was good news for 24 hours, but then sparked a big bout of market volatility. Last Thursday’s changes to ECB monetary policy pushed the euro down and risk markets up, before a few words in the press conference unleashed a quick reversal.

Against that background, on a 12-month horizon our Asset Allocation Committee is, not surprisingly, neutral on U.S. equity, neutral on emerging market equity, neutral on emerging market debt, neutral on inflation-protected Treasuries and neutral on commodities. Our only biases at the moment are slight overweights in non-U.S. developed market equities and high yield bonds and underweights in government and investment-grade bonds.

That’s good. The Committee is resisting the bias to action. But then again, there is a view that something should be done. And here’s the interesting thing: Underneath the disciplined neutrality at the asset class level there is a lot going on.

The S&P 500 Index ended 2015 almost exactly where it started. Today it is not far from that same level. Similarly, commodity prices and credit markets are back where they were at the start of 2016. It doesn’t feel that way, though. Recent months have witnessed some of the most vicious market rotations of the past five years.

In other words, while taking medium-term, high-conviction directional positions in asset classes has become very difficult for asset allocators, there are widespread opportunities for individual underlying investment category managers, adding value through shorter-term trading or relative-value positions (which also tend to be more tactical). In our view, positioning within asset classes may be more beneficial than positioning between them. There is also value in thinking about your portfolio as a collection of individual positions with different time horizons, as well as a collection of different asset classes.

Within fixed income, some opportunities are easier to identify: You can buy higher-yielding bonds and companies with decent credit positions and sell lower (or indeed negative) yielding sovereign debt. In currencies, everything is a relative value position by default, so this can be a robust source of added value in these environments. In equities, there are some extreme valuations out there if you look in the right places: The cumulative outperformance of momentum stocks over value stocks is higher than at any time since the dot-com bubble, for example, and we believe that relationship will eventually begin reverting to the mean.

Having said that, short-term volatility does still create opportunity at the asset class level. In this environment, you could well boost positions in risky assets more broadly when markets sell off, but perhaps on a hedged basis through long/short strategies, paying away some of the asset-class exposure in exchange for limited downside. Visibility may be low, but opportunity needn’t be.

From all of this, three principles stand out. Active management becomes crucial. Incorporating alternative sources of compensated risk—value versus momentum, liquidity and volatility plays, spread trades—becomes an important tool in the toolbox. And risk management is paramount when you include these more tactical sources of excess return potential in portfolios.

What would make us comfortable favoring more directional risk? A breakdown in the correlation between oil and stock markets; a bottom for commodity prices; stabilization for some of the fundamental data points coming out of China; improved U.S. corporate earnings; and less reliance on negative interest rate policy from central banks.

Given the current mixed signals from the global economy, markets and policymakers, the full toolbox in multi-asset investing is likely to be useful for a good while yet.

Neuberger Berman’s CIO insight

Concerns Over Negative Interest Rates Overshadow the RMB at the G20 Shanghai Meeting

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

The Shanghai G20 meeting concluded with little to show; though little was expected. In line with other global finance leaders’ meetings, the group recognized that while the world economy continues to expand below trend growth, the situation isn’t dire enough to call for coordinated action.

Going into the meeting, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) Governor Zhou Xiaochuan garnered the most attention given that China was hosting the summit. Questions surfaced about how the central bank would balance foreign exchange rates and much needed reform programs. Unsurprisingly, Governor Zhou reiterated the fact that there was no basis for continued weakening of the yuan and that he would not support exports using competitive devaluation.

Instead, growing acceptance over the use of negative interest rates as a form of monetary policy to spur growth seemed to overshadow China and the RMB. This was best summarized by German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who said “the debt-financed growth model has reached its limits,” and central banks accepting negative interest rate policies will become a recurring and important theme. The implications are important. First, from an economic standpoint, negative interest rates are viewed as irrational policies as they counter the idea that the future value of money should be greater than the net preserve value. Second, the functioning of banks wanes as they pass up deposit costs in order to prevent withdrawals.

Like other economies, China will need to navigate around this situation. After markets closed on the Monday following the G20 summit, the PBOC cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 50bps, a move that was seen as a surprise due to the timing of the decision. Releasing an estimate RMB700bn in the banking system, the PBOC move is viewed as extended loose monetary policies, though the liquidity injection likely offsets some open market operations that are expected to mature later on. This would suggest that the PBOC is focused on its domestic policies, which investors should welcome.

China’s next major meeting will be the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) scheduled for the beginning of March. Central authorities are expected to revise their growth estimates from “around 7%” to a stabilized 6.5% to 7.0% estimate. No large scale stimulus is expected. However, following Zhou’s comments at the G20 meeting, it shouldn’t be a surprise to see the PBOC offset counter cyclical measures as it addresses supply side reform. The NPC meeting will likely provide the market with greater clarity on the thinking of the PBOC, especially since this meeting will not be attended by the other 19 G’s.

Bond Markets: a Macro-Economic Cocktail that Calls for a Selective Approach

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

The global economy is struggling to grow, and is likely to do so for some time to come. Investors should adapt to this new reality, just as they are being buffeted by a number of economic crosswinds: a strengthening US dollar with its disruptive impact on emerging economies, the knock-on effect on developed nations, deteriorating US fundamentals sparked by a turn in the credit cycle, but an improving economic outlook for Europe, helped by supportive monetary policy.

Against this background, finding investment opportunities is a delicate exercise. With such uncertainty, I believe it is important to focus on quality and liquidity.

The world, in my view, is facing three major challenges: levels of global debt, demographics and deflation.

Since 2007, global debt has increased by $57tn, outpacing world GPD growth. The rise in debt is particularly noticeable in countries like China where the level of corporate debt has scaled new heights, in particular debt issued by non-financials (energy and construction).

When it comes to demographics, the falling birthrate in developed countries has led to the ageing of the population, notably a drop in the population aged between 24 and 52. This age group is the one that drives consumption and economic growth. In other words, demographics will most likely weigh on economic growth over the next few years.

While we are optimistic about the outlook for government bonds because of these two factors – debt levels and demographics – we think what is most important is the phenomenon of “good deflation”, which comes from disruptive technologies and the way firms such as Google, Uber and Amazon change how to do business.

Slowly but surely, these disruptive technologies are taking pricing power away from companies and putting it into the hands of the consumer. As a result, firms are finding it increasingly hard to increase prices, hence “good deflation”. By contrast, deflation, or disinflation, is a long term trend, and has more to do with global overcapacity. Firms are simply producing too much, helped by quantitative easing which has led to a misallocation of capital.

Another consequence of QE has been an increase in the prices of every asset, particularly when it comes to house prices. Housing is the most important component of inflation, looking at the inflation structure in the US. QE has led to higher prices of houses, and then to higher rents. Without this component, inflation in the US is close to zero and the US Federal Reserve, in our view, should focus on that point.

Additionally, the official US unemployment rate is 4.9%, but it doesn’t take into account the participation rate. Factoring this in the real unemployment rate is closer to 13%. Pressure on wages is not that significant, particularly as the jobs created are mostly low-paid jobs in the services sector, including many part-time positions, while the jobs lost were largely well-paid positions. We think therefore there is slack in the labour market.

The manufacturing PMI in the US is about 48, so below a reading of 50 that signifies the sector is expanding: in other words, this key indicator is suggesting there is more than a 50% probability that the country is heading into recession. Services PMI is still above the 50, but it usually takes the same route as the manufacturing PMI (historically, the manufacturing PMI leads the way.)

We think the US Federal Reserve was mistaken in raising the rate in December, because it increased volatility in emerging markets. Despite recent acknowledgment by Janet Yellen of increased macro weakness both within the US and globally, the path of interest rates in the US remains far from clear.

For all these reasons, we prefer to stay away from US corporate debt.

In addition, we are avoiding emerging credit markets. Emerging debt, particularly emerging corporate debt, has been growing significantly in the last few years. The debt burden has getting heavier as loans were often taken out in US dollars. At the time, servicing the debt was relatively cheap but the strengthening of the US dollar has raised the cost of repayment by quite some margin.

Emerging market dollar reserves are falling, suggesting investors are unwinding one of the biggest carry trade we’ve ever witnessed. Since 2009, between seven and nine trillion have been borrowed in US dollars and invested in emerging assets (Chinese financial markets, Chinese housing market, Brazilian debt). Given the fall of local currencies and recession in emerging countries, the situation seems perilous and we prefer to avoid it, even more so as we think it is only a question of time before Saudi Arabia break its peg with the US dollar and China proceeds with a devaluation of its currency.

As a major player in the commodities market, China’s slowdown has an important impact. Commodity prices are currently low and are likely to stay low for a while. Only gold is likely to hold its own, helped by its reputation as a safe haven asset especially if a currency war breaks out, which we believe is bound to happen sooner or later, and above all, when the Fed starts reversing its monetary policy.

The European economy has started to deleverage, unlike the United States. Europe has good momentum, judging by current PMI levels, and its monetary policy is supportive.

In short, we continue to see opportunities within European credit, investment grade bonds and high yield, although we are adopting a more defensive stance and security selection remains paramount.

Column by Ariel Bezalel, fund manager of the Jupiter Dynamic Bond Fund at Jupiter AM

March: In Like a Lamb, Out Like a Lion?

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

In the old days, they said that when March comes in like a lamb it goes out like a lion. The proverb is rooted in the reality that, in the northern hemisphere at least, this month’s weather tends to be changeable and unpredictable—volatile, as we might say in the investing industry. At this time of year, winter and spring contend with one another like bears and bulls in financial markets. When it comes to the seasons, however, we may suffer the odd gale, but we know the days will lengthen, the air will warm. The markets are not so easy to forecast.

Still, March certainly came in like a lamb. The wintry blast of risk aversion lifted around February 11. Since then, world equities are up more than 8%, the VIX Index has fallen from 28 to less than 17 and the price of oil has stabilized. Emerging markets have joined the rally, suggesting that investors are regaining confidence to take long-term value positions. The correlation between daily moves in the oil price and equity markets that had spiked since December is breaking down. Both things suggest investors are focusing on underlying fundamentals again.

Positive data releases are translating into good news for portfolios. Earnings season was not necessarily great—the Q4 decline in U.S. earnings marked the first time there had been three consecutive quarters of year-on-year declines since 2009—but the soft spots in energy and banking were expected and there were few nasty surprises. Last week’s U.S. manufacturing PMI was healthy, construction spending was up, consumers surprised on the upside, and the latest inflation and unemployment indicators looked favorable. Given the improved U.S. economic outlook, markets are again pricing in higher probabilities of modest Fed rate hikes for 2016.

But let’s not forget the other half of that proverb. Is there a lion out there, waiting in the weeds?

In recent editions of our “CIO Perspectives” my colleagues and I acknowledged some serious fundamental challenges to global growth, but argued that the selling was overdone. Some “overselling” has unwound, but the challenges remain:

The price of oil may have stabilized, but it remains low and the future trend is far from clear.
China is still going through its economic transition and recent data has been soft: Last week saw the People’s Bank of China cut its required reserve ratio to add to short-term stimulus, Moody’s switch its outlook on the sovereign debt to negative, and a series of weak PMIs that hurt confidence.
Europe continues with a similar struggle for positive momentum, with soft manufacturing data from Germany and the U.K. and another dip into deflation coming through last week.

And that brings us to the catalysts that could unleash the lion of March: the ECB meeting on the 10th and the Fed meeting a week later. Once again, there is ample scope for market expectations to be met, exceeded or disappointed, and for disruptive signals to be sent. For all the semblance of “normality” over recent weeks, it will be events like these that continue to drive markets, create volatility and dampen the prospects of a sustained breakout by risk assets—at least until we have much stronger levels of confirmation out of the economic data, the earnings outlook and interest-rate expectations. Winter may not have released its grip just yet.

Convertible Bonds: Quality and Potential

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

In 2015, global convertible bond issuance totaled USD 82 billion, a very decent level, although slightly down in comparison to 2014 and 2013. Overall, the past four years have seen a supportive dynamism in the primary activity across the major convertible bond markets, with repeated but also first-time issuers adding to the global convertible bond supply.

While the volume of the primary issuance is an important element of the renewal of our market, selectivity remains the key pillar. Our philosophy leads us to primarily focus on accessing cheap option characteristics and strong bond-floors. This answers to one key objective: capturing the convex potential of the asset class.

This implies to differentiate between the most expensive convertible bonds – for which the convex potential is considerably limited – and those which, in contrast, display strong drivers of convexity: cheap implied volatility, high credit quality, strong upside potential. Thus, in the latter part of 2015, our preference went to the Brenntag and FCT-Iren new issues, rather than to the latest deals from Vodafone and Total, whose pricing terms at issuance appeared relatively less attractive to us. Similarly, in January, while we found strong value in the Safran 0% 2020 new issue, we did not participate in the Technip 0.875% 2021, which displayed, at issuance, a higher implied volatility level for similar credit quality profile.

In the long run, convertible bonds’ convex potential is what has enabled the asset class to deliver enhanced risk-adjusted returns relative to equities. We were glad to see that this attractive feature was equally evidenced in the shorter term. Over 2015 market ups and downs, the Stoxx Europe 50 NR posted a volatility 3 times higher than European convertible bonds (represented by the Thomson Reuters Europe Convertible Index €-hedged) for an equivalent yearly performance.

Column by Nicolas Delrue

Negative Rates Explained: Are Central Banks Opening Pandora’s Box?

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Tipos de interés negativos: ¿están los bancos centrales abriendo la caja de Pandora? — CC-BY-SA-2.0, FlickrPhoto: Mark Vegas. Negative Rates Explained: Are Central Banks Opening Pandora’s Box?

The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has followed central banks in Denmark, the Eurozone, Sweden and Switzerland by imposing a negative interest rate on a portion of commercial bank reserves – see chart. In Switzerland and Sweden, the main policy interest rate, as well as the marginal rate on reserves, is below zero. Short-term interbank interest rates are negative in all five cases, explains Simon Ward, Chief Economist at Henderson.

Ampliar

Danish rates were cut below zero to preserve the currency peg with the euro. Unwanted currency strength was also a key reason for the Swiss and Swedish moves to negative. The European Central Bank (ECB) and BoJ justify negative rates by reference to their inflation targets, but both central banks have welcomed currency weakness in recent years.

“An individual bank can avoid negative rates by using excess liquidity to increase lending or invest in securities. This is not, however, possible for the banking system as a whole, since the total amount of reserves is fixed by the central bank. A reduction in reserves by one bank will be matched by an increase for others. Negative rates, therefore, act as a tax on the banking system. The Danish, Swiss and Japanese systems reduce this tax by imposing negative rates only on the top tier of bank reserves,” says Ward.

Pros and cons

According to the expert, supporters of negative rates argue that a cut to below zero provides a net economic stimulus, even if the effects are smaller than a reduction when rates are positive. The move to negative, they claim, puts further downward pressure on banks’ lending and deposit rates, boosting borrowing and deterring “hoarding”. It also encourages “portfolio rebalancing” into higher-risk / foreign investments, implying a rise in asset prices and / or a fall in the exchange rate. Higher asset prices may yield a positive “wealth effect” on demand, while a lower currency stimulates net exports.

And, opponents of negative rates, highlights Chief Economist at Henderson, argue that they squeeze banks’ profitability, making them less likely to expand their balance sheets. Banks in the above countries have been unwilling to impose negative rates on retail deposits, fearing that such action would trigger large-scale cash withdrawals. This has limited their ability to lower lending rates without damaging margins. Banks need to maintain profits to generate capital to back lending expansion. Any boost to asset prices from negative rates, moreover, is likely to prove temporary without an improvement in “fundamentals”, while exchange rate depreciation is a zero-sum game.

Cash withdrawal

Ward points out that radical thinkers such as the Bank of England’s Andrew Haldane have suggested increasing the scope and effectiveness of negative rates by placing restrictions on or penalising the use of cash. Such measures could allow banks to impose negative rates on retail as well as wholesale deposits without suffering large-scale withdrawals, thereby increasing their ability to lower lending rates while maintaining or increasing margins. Such proposals may be of theoretical interest but are unlikely to be politically feasible. They are dangerous, since they risk undermining public confidence in money’s role as a store of value.

Just the beginning?

As a conlusion, Henerson´expert says that central banks’ experimentation with negative rates is likely to extend. “ECB President Draghi has given a strong indication of a further cut in the deposit rate in March, while the recent BoJ move is widely viewed as a first step. The ECB may copy other central banks by introducing a tiered system to mitigate the negative impact on bank profits and increase the scope for an even lower marginal rate. The necessity and wisdom of such initiatives are open to question. The risk is that central bankers are opening Pandora’s Box and that any short-term stimulus benefits will be outweighed by longer-term damage to the banking system and public confidence in monetary stability”, concludes.

Simon Ward is Chief Economist at Henderson.

Six Afores account for 78% of investments in CKDs

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Seis Afores concentran el 78% de las inversiones en CKDs — CC-BY-SA-2.0, FlickrPhoto: Adrian Naik. Six Afores account for 78% of investments in CKDs

CKDs exposure in Afores grew 26% in 2015, to the equivalent of US$8.6 billion, which represents almost 6% of the Afore’s assets under management. CKDs are the vehicle by which the Afores can invest in private equity. Regulatory limits for this kind of investment still allow the Afores to increase their positions more than two fold to almost 18% of Assets Under Management.

According to Capital 414, firm that provides service and corporate financial consulting, during 2015 about US$1 billion through 19 issues, went to market. This figure represents almost double the issuances observed over the previous year and represents the third best year in issuances since their inception in 2008. In 2010 about US$1.2 billion were issued and in 2012, US$1.4 billion. Capital 414 states that there are close to US$1.9 billion dollars in the pipeline.

Through investment in CKDs, Afores have financed a growing range of projects and companies. According to Consar, 32% of CKDs available invest in Real Estate (Malls, Retail/office, properties, Housing); 29% in Infrastructure (Hospitals, Universities, Highways, Airports, Logistic platforms); 24% other Private Equity (E-commerce, Health Industry, Touristic services, Food and restaurants); 7% in Financial Assets (Subordinated/ Mezzanine/ Convertible Loans, Loan Portfolios); 5% are Forest Projects (Development and commercialization of plants and wood in Campeche) and only 3% is allocated to Energy (hydroelectric power stations Oil platforms). Given the resource requirements in sectors such as Infrastructure and Energy it is expected to see higher issues in these sectors during the coming years.

At the end of 2015 the Afores with higher investments in CKDs were Afore Banamex with nearly US$2 billion; Sura and XXI Banorte with US$1.6 billion each; while Profuturo and PensionISSSTE had US$833 and US$667 million each. These six Afores account for 78% of total holdings in these securities, according to firm Capital 414.

With investments between US$300 and US$600 million dollars are Invercap with US$556 million dollars; Principal with US$444 million dollars; Inbursa with US$333 million dollars and Coppel with US$278 million. The two Afores with fewer investments in CKD’s are Metlife and Azteca with US$167 and US$56 million dollar respectively.

The participation of Afores in this type of instrument means a great responsibility in terms of selection and diversification, hence the importance that the CONSAR has given to these investments which not only require a thorough analysis, but also approval of the independent member of the investment committee.

Politics and Your Portfolio

| For Gabriela Huerta | 0 Comentarios

It is “Super Tuesday” here in the U.S. Last week, all the talk in Europe was about “Brexit.” These newspaper buzzwords rarely figure in investors’ strategy meetings. But a new specter is haunting markets: the specter of political risk.

By Friday, February 19, the sterling-dollar exchange rate had been testing secular lows for a month. On top of policy divergence between the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, negotiations over a new settlement between the U.K. and the European Union had introduced the risk of “Brexit”—Britain exiting the EU—into the trade. Many thought things were overcooked, and indeed the exchange rate pulled back in late trading as news of a deal trickled out from Brussels.

But then came Sunday night. Boris Johnson, the charismatic mayor of London tipped to challenge for the U.K. premiership when David Cameron leaves office, announced he would campaign to leave the EU. Sterling opened sharply lower on Monday, and as a surprising number of U.K. cabinet ministers joined the “leave” camp, it burst through resistance levels, falling almost 4% against the dollar in four days. “Brexit” was suddenly a market-moving risk.

We’ve witnessed something similar in the U.S. Even a month ago, a second-place finish in the Iowa caucuses persuaded many that Donald Trump’s bid for the Republican Party’s presidential nomination was finally choking. Trump, the Democrats’ Bernie Sanders and other “non-establishment” characters would grab the headlines. Volatility might erupt in certain sectors thanks to the rough-and-tumble of the campaign—witness biotech stocks after Hillary Clinton’s comments on drug pricing last fall. But familiar-looking figures would end up contesting the general election and no single party would get enough leverage on Capitol Hill to change current economic, and therefore market, realities.

We ourselves worked on that assumption until very recently. Three Trump victories and a Boris defection later, it no longer suffices: when these things move markets, asset allocators need to take them into account, too.

At the same time one shouldn’t lose sight of an important truth: politics makes for great blogs and cocktail-party talk, but the vast majority of it does not affect economic realities for the longer term. The market volatility it generates is often just noise. To put it another way, at this point we do not see any of these things as identifiable investment themes for the longer term, in the way that, say, the election of Shinzo Abe in 2012 has been. But they are risks that need to be managed.

How might asset allocators frame this problem? We see three potential courses of action:

Hedge specific risks, or make specific trades related to expected outcomes.
Reduce whole-portfolio risk exposure to take account of additional, generalized volatility.
Take contrarian positions when you believe pricing has gone too far.

When political risks begin to move markets, we believe it makes sense to do at least one of these things, but possibly to do all three at once, in different markets. Right now, we would suggest that so many risk factors are resonating—from “Brexit,” Trump and Sanders, through the rise of populism in Europe and the faltering of “Abenomics” in Japan, to loss of confidence in central banks—that identifying specific hedges is difficult. Alongside the oil price, concerns about China’s growth and flagging U.S. corporate earnings, these things add up to make us favor the second option, managing whole-portfolio risk until we get more clarity.

When there is more clarity, we may favor option one or three, double-down on option two—or possibly revert to a medium-term strategy of adding risk assets at appealing valuations. The important thing is the thought process, which we think provides a frame of reference for asset allocators who need to acknowledge the recent elevation of political risk in markets without being tugged this way and that by the daily headlines.

Neuberger Berman’s CIO insight